Standing Committee B

[Mr. James Cran in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Clause 151 - The Sentencing Guidelines Council

Amendment moved [this day]: No.518, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 22, at end insert 
 'which shall include as deputy chairman the Secretary of State for Home Department, or a person whom he nominates in his stead, and the chairman of the appropriate committee of the House of Commons, or a person whom he nominates in his stead, who, together with the Lord Chief Justice, shall comprise the Executive Committee of the Council'.—[Mr. Allen.]

James Cran: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following amendments:
 No. 519, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 24, at end insert 
 'and the chairman of the appropriate committee of the House of Commons.'.
 No. 520, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert— 
 '(4) The other members of the council will include at least one of each of the following— 
 (a) a Lord Chief Justice of Appeal; 
 (b) a judge of the High Court; 
 (c) a Circuit judge; 
 (d) a District judge; 
 (e) a District judge (Magistrates' Courts); 
 (f) a lay justice; 
 (g) a Police Officer; 
 (h) a Probation Officer; 
 (i) a Prison Governor; 
 (j) a representative of a Victims' Organisation; 
 (k) a representative of the Business Community; 
 (l) a teachers' representative; 
 (m) three lay members of the public one of whom shall be over the age of 60 and one of whom shall be under 18; 
 (n) a representative of exoffenders' institutions; 
 (o) a local government/crime and disorder partnership representative; 
 (p) a legal professional, alternately a barrister or solicitor; 
 (q) a social services representative.'.
 No. 521, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 31, leave out subsection (5).
 No. 541, in 
clause 153, page 85, line 21, leave out line 21 and insert— 
 '(2) The Secretary of State, Lord Chancellor or Chairman of the appropriate committee of the House of Commons must first propose to the Sentencing Advisory Panel that it prepares a report and recommendation prior to any consideration of the Council—'.
 No. 638, in 
clause 153, page 86, line 17, at end add— 
 '(ii) the appropriate committee of the House of Commons.'.
 No. 687, in 
clause 252, page 138, line 8, at end insert 
 ' ''the appropriate committee of the House of Commons'' means any select committee of the House of Commons which the House of Commons may from time to time designate by resolution to be the appropriate committee for the purposes of this Act;'.

Graham Allen: I welcome you to this afternoon's sitting, Mr. Cran. I was getting on to amendment No. 520 and talking about the need to broaden the sentencing council so that it commands more widespread support, which all the various people involved in sentencing want. However, they are all mistrustful of the others involved in sentencing, and not prepared to give a little bit of their sovereignty in order to be stronger in the sentencing council.
 As is often the case in Committees, a lot of discussion goes on outside Committee. One or two colleagues have expressed strong support for the concepts contained in the amendments, but have said, ''I wonder what the judiciary will make of this.'' That is why I have attempted to reassure the Lord Chief Justice by proxy through the amendments—there are other amendments later that seek to reassure the judiciary. It is incumbent on us all here, including the Minister, when he is in a position to discuss such matters with the judiciary, to give them the reassurance about their role that they require. No one that I have spoken to on the matter intends to undermine the judiciary or rob them of the final power. 
 The very first amendment that I moved to kick off this part of the Bill—it was probably over a week ago and seems a long time now—sought to ensure that the judges would continue to have discretion in individual cases. I was pleased to hear the reassurances that the Minister gave on that. I hope that that will help the judiciary to come to terms with the fact that we are all trying to feel our way towards something that will unite the various people involved in sentencing, and who will therefore all be a lot stronger when the sentencing proposals are finally put into the public domain. The public will feel more trust in the criminal justice system because of that process. 
 On amendment No. 520, I was talking about one or two of the ideas that members of the Committee have put forward about who might be on the council. It has been suggested that it include a representative of the business community or a teacher's representative. That could be important, because we have all had the same experience of talking to teachers and head teachers in our constituencies who say, ''Yes, we can spot, within three or four weeks of their going to primary school, the children who will be difficult for us, who will be underachievers at secondary school and who might eventually go into a life of crime.'' It could be extremely valuable to feed their pre-emptive views, taken well before any child comes before the courts, into the broader process. 
 The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) suggested to me the possibility of having an older person and a younger person on the council, and I have put that idea into 
 amendment No. 520. The perceptions of our society of the person over 60 will be different from those of the young person who is under 18. It was interesting how, almost without noticing it, hon. Members took cognisance of the fact that earlier in the morning we had a Gallery full of young people. The mere fact that they were here made us think about how they might respond on drug questions and whether there should be testing at 10, 14 or 18. The Home Secretary, the Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs and the Lord Chief Justice might experience a similar, beneficial effect if a young person from a group associated with drug misuse was seated at the table when sentencing was discussed—it certainly would not do any harm for such people to take part. 
 A representative of an ex-offenders institution is another obvious suggestion. I bow to the expertise of my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) in this regard, but many of us have talked to ex-offenders and ex-drug users about the best way to tackle the problem of sentencing, and some have very interesting and innovative ideas. It may be a matter not simply of a harder sentence, but of a more difficult sentence. Often, that could be prescribed by someone who had been through a similar horrendous experience and come out the other side. That would leaven the view of the professionals and experts, among whom we would probably number ourselves and certainly the judiciary. Ministers would also fall into that category. 
 The amendment also suggests that we include someone from the local government area or the crime and disorder partnership—I hope that Labour Members are very proud of that innovation and its beneficial impact. Partnerships have pulled agencies together and promoted multi-agency, group working. That is proving incredibly effective—certainly in my area. Perhaps sentencing is not simply a matter of deciding between a custodial and a community sentence, and such individuals might bring a mix of social service intervention, probation intervention and health intervention to the party. They might be able to bring such things to bear in terms of more effective sentencing. 
 The list goes on to propose a legally qualified professional and someone from social services. Each of us would have our own list, and I hope that the Minister will ponder this particular list to help him figure out whether we could do the job better. 
 The objective in tabling all the amendments is simple. As a nation, we have lost faith in the criminal justice system, particularly sentencing. The Committee has a tremendous opportunity to give my hon. Friend the Minister some background and some ideas that he can discuss with colleagues in the Government and with the judiciary. We could then have a credible, broad-based Sentencing Guidelines Council that reassured everyone involved in sentencing. Its decision-making process would be protracted, and I shall explain in later amendments why that should be. We should never again introduce poorly presented sentencing guidelines a few days before Christmas on the back of a single case or issue an edict about 
 sentencing on the back of a murder that took place only a couple of days before. We should have a protracted process that involves, networks and reassures everyone who has an interest. We need such a process above all because we must reconnect the public with sentencing. In that respect, the Committee has a fantastic opportunity, and I hope that we will seize it this afternoon.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman has done the Committee a particularly good turn by drafting his amendments and initiating the debate. When he first sought my views on his amendments, I said that they were not without difficulty. I shall return to those difficulties in a minute, but they do not mean that we should not discuss the amendments.
 Of one thing I am certain: the current sentencing framework and the way in which we set out guidelines or deal with principles is deeply unsatisfactory. The hon. Gentleman is right; it does not command public respect. In particular, although the judiciary are supposed to be independent in fixing the guidelines within the parameters laid down by Parliament on maximum and sometimes minimum sentences—usually maximum—the public perception is that they are not. First, it often appears that they allow events, whether a particularly notorious case or the simple fact of prison overcrowding, to dictate sentencing policy. The concern that was expressed at the recent pronouncement of the Lord Chief Justice on burglary was that it was perceived by the public—rightly, I fear—to be entirely dictated by the crisis in prison numbers and not by any other analysis as to what was appropriate in order to reduce burglary or deter burglars. 
 Although judges are not supposed to be subject to political interference, it is abundantly clear that lines of communication run between Ministers and the judiciary that can be, and are, used to indicate areas of concern. That is not necessarily illegitimate, because judges would not be doing their job properly if they were not receptive to what they heard from those around them as to what was appropriate with regard to sentencing. However, there is an absence of transparency in that process. In particular, people gain the impression that the judges have dreamed something up out of thin air, albeit that is the impression that is sought to be given to them, whereas the reality is totally different. 
 If I say this now, I hope that it will avoid debate later. The Government's broad brush proposal for setting up the Sentencing Guidelines Council in the form that is proposed in the clause is a step forward in clarity. One only has to look in ''Archbold'' at sentencing guidelines under the broad heading of sentences of imprisonment, to see how arcane and complicated it is to cross-reference between the various dicta of judges in individual cases and the incremental development of standards that should be applied. They are sometimes mutually contradictory, always difficult to understand and frequently not properly applied by the judges themselves—probably because, in many cases, they do not understand them. 
 It is also noteworthy that it is clearly established that judges are not completely free and independent to disregard parameters. I shall come back to the matter later in respect of a further group of amendments, but I hope that it is appropriate to mention it here in relation to my amendments that concern Parliament. I refer again to ''Archbold'', which says, at paragraph 5–91, on the most serious example of the offence: 
''The fact that the sentencer considers that Parliament has set the maximum sentence for a particular offence too low is not a ground for imposing the maximum sentence when there are relevant mitigating factors such as a plea of guilty (see R v Carroll, 16 Criminal Appeal reports 488 CA)''.
 Therefore, as an issue of principle, it is clearly wrong to say that the judges are not fettered by what other people—particularly Parliament—are saying. The argument that judges must be left in their ivory towers in order to be seen to be entirely free from any pressure or interference is not tenable, even in respect of the existing state of affairs. However, I accept that it is important that the judiciary should not feel that they are being pressured into impossible positions within the ambit of their discretion. 
 One of the areas about which we shall need to hear from the Minister is how the Lord Chief Justice views the amendment standing in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). Some indication of how the judiciary are reacting to the proposals is needed. 
 I now turn to the specifics. I found myself attracted by the proposal, so I signed the amendment. We should consider whether the Sentencing Guidelines Council should be widened to include individuals other than judges. There is always a slight danger of tokenism if we go down such a route. Nevertheless, it seems perfectly practical to put together a council to come up with sentencing guidelines that consists of those who are interested in the workings of the criminal justice system. It may be thought that judges object to having to sit with others in determining those guidelines. However, at present the judiciary are fettered by the guidelines that other judges have drawn up. That is effectively what is happening, and not necessarily happening on the basis of an individual case decision. Therefore, as I have said, I am attracted by the hon. Gentleman's proposal. 
 We can discuss in detail—other members may wish to do so—exactly who should sit on the council. Broadly speaking, however, the hon. Gentleman identified the sorts of people who should be on it. How will those guidelines in practice, once they are issued, tie down the judiciary? That is where the issue will become more difficult. That is the area in which I foresee scope for conflict. To what extent will the judge, who wishes to recommend a sentence that may depart from the guidelines, be constrained by public pressure from within the guidelines council? We shall need explanation and guidance from the Minister about how the judiciary views that issue. The judiciary must be listened to carefully, but it should not have an overriding veto.

Ian Lucas: I am following the hon. Gentleman's argument closely and I welcome his
 general support for the amendment. Why does he feel that the guidelines that the new body will issue would be any different in their effect from the sentencing guidelines that the courts regularly follow?

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point but, if I have interpreted correctly the direction in which we are going, sentencing guidelines, under the Government's proposals, should become a much more regular tool for providing a structure within which sentencing should take place. However, the judiciary must use the guidelines properly, and the Lord Chief Justice and the council must operate properly. That is my interpretation of the new sentencing council. I accept that the judiciary might fail to do what is intended.
 I must say that, in my slight experience, there are huge areas of criminal law within the scope of sentencing guidelines that remain extremely woolly. If current sentencing guidelines were the determining factor on sentences, ''Archbold'' would not be worded as it is. ''Archbold'' refers people round the houses to determine what the correct sentence should be. Some of the cases used are 30 or 40 years old. The new guidelines should all be much more apparent and clear. 
 However, the hon. Gentleman is quite right—it may turn out not to be the case, and the Minister will doubtless enlighten us on this in due course. However, I had assumed that, in putting the guidelines council in this form in this statute, it was the Government's intention that the guidelines council would in future be a much more high-profile and prominent body for laying down sentencing guidelines. If I am wrong, the Minister can either interrupt me or deal with the matter later.

Graham Allen: Obviously, no one can speak for the Minister, but the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) may like to consider that the guidelines are part of a wider process, and that part of the Government's intention is to involve the public. That would take us to a qualitatively different dimension, the intention being that the public understand sentencing—probably for the first time.

Dominic Grieve: I agree. I return to the point that I was making, which might technically be possible if the models that the Minister or the hon. Member for Nottingham, North are proposing are adopted, although I am bound to say that I find that the latter's model gives me greater reassurance that that will happen. That is one of the reasons why I was attracted to it.
 I do not intend to say more at this stage, but I shall have the opportunity to speak, on a later group of amendments, about the level of parliamentary involvement. The amendments could be hitched to what the hon. Gentleman proposes; they could equally well be hitched to what the Minister now proposes. They raise a discrete issue, so I shall not develop the argument now. 
 One of the public's complaints is that they have a sense of powerlessness when trying to make their views known on sentence tariffs or guidelines with which they disagree. They are right to make their views 
 known, because the judiciary are effectively isolated—deliberately so—from such pressure. The pressure lands instead on the Minister, who says that there is nothing that he can do about it—unless the tariff for the offence is changed. That is how we got into the business of mandatory five-year sentences for gun possession—a sentence that had to be watered down in the light of reality, once it was appreciated that exceptions have to be made. That is a classic example of how Ministers have had to respond, while passing the buck to the judges. 
 If there was a level of parliamentary involvement, as I shall propose at a later stage, there would be an immediate channel to enable people to say that they did not like things as they stood. Politicians will not be able to duck that issue. However, I shall return to that point in due course. In the meantime, I thank the hon. Member for Nottingham, North for raising the issue, and I look forward to hearing the views of other members of the Committee.

John Mann: I rise briefly to support the principle that we are discussing, assisted by the amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North. Should any journalist be present, I should point out that I was recently mistaken for him by a newspaper and that many of his proposals were attributed to me. I did not, of course, deny it.
 I want to speak about the principle rather than specifics, because it is clearly a probing amendment. We rightly heard from the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the public's perceptions and complaints. Another interesting perspective is shared in my area by the police—and by criminals. It is about the absurdity of some of the sentences that are passed on drug offenders. Indeed, I pointed out to the Minister that such absurdities had crept into the Bill in a number of places; for instance, fines are proposed as a sanction for not fulfilling the criteria of community sentences. The absurdity is that addicted heroin offenders, who are responsible for 95 per cent. of all crime in the western part of my constituency, will, when fined, go out and steal more to fund their addiction. They tend not to have reserves of cash. 
 Criminals point to that absurdity. Some did so vocally in my public inquiry, and the police accorded and made exactly the same point at every level, from local constable to chief constable. Therefore it is crucial that we have a sentencing system that is thoughtful and responsive and listens to the community. 
 I would also observe that the Home Office and the legal profession have a long obsession for determining what is appropriate. I note that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North goes some way to add to that by incorporating the probation service into the clause. The amendment proposes involving the probation service in making judgments on what sentence is appropriate for a drugs offender. The probation service does have expertise, training and experience in these matters, but in a general, not a specialist way. How will whoever is appointed to the 
 guidelines council go about consulting the wider community? I doubt that putting a drug-addicted repeat offender from my area on such a body would contribute greatly to the debate. 
 However, if we discuss the issues with such people we may find that they are in accord with the police that there is a need for stricter sentencing. I reached that surprising conclusion after discussions with many of my constituents: often drugs offenders want to be sentenced and sent to prison because it gives them a structured form of treatment and detoxing, albeit one that is expensive for the state. Some will admit offences that they did not commit in the hope of receiving a prison sentence rather than a fine. Consultation of that kind is critical. 
 My final point is that there is a very good case for introducing drugs courts to deal with such offences. They would be dealt with by experts rather than be thrown into the general legal process. We will leave that to the consideration of the Minister and the Department.

David Heath: I support the thrust of the amendments. We are not discussing their details; we are discussing the principles enshrined in them. The hon. Member for Nottingham, North is right in two respects: first, many people feel a disconnection between what they consider to be right and effective and the sentencing that they see reported in the press. We must deal with that sense of disconnection. The second principle in which the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right is that a Sentencing Guidelines Council, however it may be constituted, must take a long-term and reasoned view of what is appropriate. It should, as far as possible, resist the day-to-day fashion of the screaming headlines.
 It would be easy to slate the tabloid editors as being the problem. However, although it is true that they partly lead public opinion, they also reflect it. We must understand that. The difficulty comes when the Executive find themselves interfering with the judiciary, as they undoubtedly do directly and indirectly, as a result of screaming headlines that may or may not be based on a reasoned approach. 
 At the moment, we have both a Prime Minister and a Home Secretary who make ex cathedra statements about such matters. That has an effect. I could go into one of my regular diatribes about the position of the Lord Chancellor, but I am sure that you, Mr. Cran, would not wish me to do so. However, we have the anomalous position of an individual who is a member of the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary simultaneously. Of course that means that the Executive have an effect on the judiciary, irrespective of claims of independence—the head of our judicial processes sits in the Cabinet, takes judicial decisions there, and assumes Cabinet responsibility. 
 I thought for a moment, when the hon. Member for Nottingham, North was introducing his comments, that he had finally found a situation in which that anomaly made sense; he seemed to have the Lord Chancellor chairing the council—one person embodying the three branches: legislature, Executive 
 and judiciary—but he corrected himself and restored the position, quite properly, to the Lord Chief Justice. 
 I was conscious, when the remarks of the Lord Chief Justice were announced at Christmas, that one of the first people in my constituency to write to me on the subject was a serving police officer, a chief superintendent. He wanted me to know how much he disagreed with what he believed had been said. He had gathered what had been said via the newspapers and it had not been accurately reported. Nevertheless, he had real concerns. We often ignore the views of the police on such issues, and we are unwise to do so; they are part of the process. However, so are a lot of other people. The benefit of what the hon. Gentleman has proposed is that it extends membership beyond the very narrow field of the judiciary to a wider circle. 
 I appreciate the arguments in the other direction. I understand why the judiciary feel that their independence might be sullied by contact with the outside world, but I do not accept that that is the case. For one moment, I misinterpreted the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and thought that he was saying that the guidelines issued by a Sentencing Guidelines Council would be less acceptable to judges if they were contaminated with the views of lay people. I do not think, having heard his further comments, that he did say that. That would be an unacceptable position. Of course, we accept and respect the expertise of such people. They have a leading role to play and we must not fetter the discretion of the judiciary in dealing with individual cases. In terms of the broad guidelines, as the hon. Member for Nottingham, North said, the community has a role to play. 
 There is a danger of tokenism—people might be appointed as ''the community'', ''the outside world'' or ''the public''. We have all witnessed situations in which that has happened—the people's peers were an example of how not to produce representatives of the people. It happens in users councils and in quangos; people are appointed to positions in order to represent a community of which they have scant knowledge, and with which they have little connection. We must be careful how we appoint people. 
 The hon. Gentleman's suggestion as to the approximate spread is right. There are interest groups and individuals who have an informed opinion to bring to the table. One such group is Members of this House; we are representatives of Everyman. We may do our job imperfectly because, as we all know, the House is not fully representative in many ways. However, it is the best that is on offer. It is important for Parliament to be involved, and the hon. Gentleman was right to say that we should not take such issues from the Floor of the House, where parliamentarians are subject to the same pressures as those that I described for the Executive. 
 It is right that Parliament should, in a considered way, have a voice. Like other members of the Committee, I find it frustrating when people write to me about judicial matters and they simply cannot understand why I can do nothing to affect outcomes that they see as grossly unjust. Of course, it is not for 
 us to interfere with judicial discretion, but this is one area in which we can set the parameters within which the judicial professions work, in a way that helps everyone. 
 To return to my original point, the amendments are very valuable, and I hope that the Minister will give them due consideration. I do not expect him to accept them in the way that he did the previous group, but I hope that they will give him a basis on which to talk to members of the judiciary. They may have serious qualms about such proposals, but they may find that there is a formula that is acceptable to them and which reassures the public and improves the system.

Lady Hermon: I am very struck by the fact that we have concentrated exclusively on the composition of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, particularly given that clause 152 deals with the Sentencing Advisory Panel. The council and the panel will have to work in conjunction, so it would be useful and informative to know the panel's membership before we reach conclusions about the council.

David Heath: The hon. Lady is right: the two will obviously need to work in conjunction. I have an innate suspicion of anything that is constituted by the Lord Chancellor—that is just a problem that I have, although the Minister will no doubt allay my suspicions. However, the hon. Lady is right. We shall come to clause 152 later, but the Minister might help us at this stage by explaining what the connections between the two bodies will be and how the panel is and will be constituted. However, that is probably enough from me, and hon. Members will want to hear the Minister.

Vera Baird: I have signed amendment No. 518 and I compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North on raising the important issue of reconnecting the public with the sentencing process. However, I do not think that the amendment hits the nail on the head.
 About 90 per cent. of sentences are given out by the magistrates court, a large proportion of whose members are drawn from the public, although there are some professionals, such as the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins). Therefore the public and, indeed, the local public, who have a great understanding of local issues and of what constitutes a local menace, already have a significant input into sentencing. 
 Of course, magistrates courts operate within guidelines, but those are not solely or, indeed, predominantly, laid down by the Court of Appeal. Nor does the Court of Appeal get that much opportunity to review what happens in the magistrates courts, because sentencing appeals go to the Crown court. Furthermore, there are Magistrates Association and magistrates court committee guidelines to assist the courts, so there is already an element of public involvement. 
 My second point—I am simply airing a few thoughts, and there are just a few, because I agree with the principle, although I am not sure about the mechanism—is that the public's experience of 
 sentencing is quite fragmentary and episodic. The hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) referred a day or two ago to a case in which a dangerous driver killed someone. The sentence was perhaps too short in the first place, and the hon. Gentleman's argument was that it was certainly too short by the time that the Court of Appeal had dealt with it. Deaths are, of course, extremely emotive and people comment that one person's death is worth more than another's because of the gravity of the sentence that followed, whereas the criminality of the perpetrator should determine the sentence. The issue of valuing a life inevitably comes into it and that life is just as lost as if the person had been murdered. That sort of episodic view of sentencing gives the public a false impression. 
 A survey into public attitudes was recently carried out, in which people were asked about rape, a subject in which I take a strong interest. Some 70 per cent. of them thought that, in the main, rapists did not receive custodial sentences. Of course, 90 per cent. of rapists or more actually receive custodial sentences, and the public's view was totally wrong. The thrust of the rest of the survey was that the public systematically underestimate the gravity of sentencing. 
 There are wider misunderstandings. A while ago, I asked my hon. Friend the Minister a written question, to which he sent me a perfect reply. There was a great mystery because some Home Office research had indicated that, in the public's view, crime was going up, when it was in fact going down. I asked what the Home Office could do to redress the balance. There is no doubt that that lack of communication breeds distrust. It is essential that the public should trust in the criminal justice system because if they suffer from crime, they must believe that the state is dealing with it properly and looking after them. The Sentencing Advisory Panel, which has been established for three or four years now, consists mainly of academics and practitioners. I know two people on the panel, and they do the most interesting things. For example, they recently considered the issue of rape sentencing. 
 The panel came across the conundrum that sentencing for rape by a stranger is higher than sentencing for rape by someone who is known to the complainant. They considered why that was and whether it should be the case. They carried out some research using a questionnaire to ascertain what the public thought about the relative gravity and relative damage done by rape by a stranger and rape by someone known to the complainant. That was an interesting piece of work, which obtained not only the public's views but the public's reasons for holding those views, in a systematic way that goes way beyond the input of public views that would result from having an assortment of figures on the Sentencing Guidelines Council. The conclusions of the panel were fed through to the Court of Appeal, which accepted them and concluded that it was possible that rape by someone known to a woman could be more harmful than rape by a stranger because it might call into question not only male behaviour but the woman's judgment for knowing the man in the first place. 
 That issue was bottomed out because the panel consulted the public widely. That is an important job, which clause 152 says that the panel will carry on doing. As I understand the system, whenever the guidelines council considers guidelines, it must first refer the issue to the panel, which will do its work after which the guidelines council will consider its proposals with great care. The process will be undertaken carefully, even if it is confined to judges. 
 I agree that we must reconnect the public, but my fear about widening the process beyond judges is that judges are not merely dipping episodically into sentencing; they do it day in, day out. Although a person may have a view about a particular crime, their view is removed from the context of many other similar crimes. Judges will sentence for, perhaps, 200 rapes in the course of their career and will have seen the relative gravity of cases. They will have watched the trial, assessed the defendant during the trial and got the measure of him because that is part of their job. They will have assessed the complainant, the evidence and the impact of the crime on society, so they will be in pole position—closely involved and very experienced—to evaluate the sentence. I fear that if we too readily disregard or discard that expertise as the thrust of how sentencing should be done, two things will follow. First, we shall miss it out and sentence by some sort of popular acclaim, however careful we try to be. Secondly, the guidelines will not have the credibility that they should have with the judiciary, because the judiciary will regard them as having come from a mixed source that is not pure, through and through, with the training that they have had. 
 If the concern of the judges is that they would not regard the guidelines as credible if the public were involved with them, that is not sufficient; the public are part of society, and the judges must change. However, I am sure that they express such reservations because they fear that their highly-trained skills will be too readily cast aside in the interests of pleasing the public. 
 My tendency would be to suggest some sort of parliamentary route for sanctioning the guidelines of the council, given that the public are assured involvement through their input to the Sentencing Advisory Panel. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North for raising the issue.

Ian Lucas: Is it not the case that the public representatives on the sentencing panel should be contributing by expressing the views of the public as to the correct general parameters for a sentence for a particular type of offence? No one is suggesting that, within the parameters, individual judges should be at all restricted in respect of individual cases. In order to retain the confidence of the public, which has been undermined in the past, it is necessary for public representatives to be involved in setting the parameters.

Vera Baird: I appreciate what my hon. Friend says. My only fear is that the judiciary, who are heavily outnumbered in the dramatis personae that has been set out, will fear that their expertise is being too readily
 discarded in the rush to please the public, and that the guidelines will not, therefore, have the credibility that they ought to have. That is my concern, and I will repeat my point that a much more systematic way of involving the public's views in sentencing is already in place through the Sentencing Advisory Panel. It is going to continue and it will have to be consulted.

Paul Stinchcombe: I want to say a few words about why I support the amendment, even though I do not disregard the expertise of the judiciary in sentencing. I have in mind the fact that three former colleagues, who were members of my chambers, are now High Court judges. Two are Lord Justices of Appeal and the other was pupil master to the Lord Chief's son. They have massive expertise in sentencing, for all of the reasons stated by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar. However, that expertise would not be diminished if there were a broader constituency of minds in the development of sentencing guidelines. Not only would the judiciary be well informed by the consultation and participation of a broader constituency of minds, but those with whom they were consulting—such as members of the probation service and prison governors—would be better informed and would have greater confidence in the sentencing if they listened to the reasoning and the experience of the judiciary.
 If the public are to have confidence in sentencing, they have to be involved somehow. Although this might not be the perfect device for it, it is a device. In progressing the matter, we need not disregard the expertise of the judges; we should simply ensure that they are switched in to the wider concerns of the public while the guidelines are being developed.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Some of the people included in the list in the amendment are not really members of the public; as the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) said, they could be experts in the field of sentencing without being members of the judiciary. The objection to the presence of judges does not strike me as being particularly tenable. The other statement about the public is that unless they have decided to make themselves experts, it could be said that they do not have the expertise to make the decision, but could contribute to the discussion. That is something that perhaps we could take further.

Paul Stinchcombe: Indeed; the hon. Gentleman has made some important points. Paragraph (m) of amendment No. 520 includes refers to
''three lay members of the public''. 
They would be qualitatively different from the others, most of whom have a role in the criminal justice system. It is not a perfect solution, but it would make a valuable contribution. I hope that the ideas that the amendment has generated will give the Home Office reason to look at a mechanism that may be better than this, but that will certainly be an improvement on the existing suggestion, which is far too exclusive in that it restricts the entirety of sentencing policy to the judiciary.

Graham Allen: It may be helpful if I pick up on a couple of the points that have been made before the Minister winds up.
 I omitted to speak to amendment No. 541, which is pertinent to the debate. It would reassure people about the process. Nothing could be worse than people arriving one morning at the sentencing council and having a show of hands on sentencing burglars. It would be disastrous. The amendment would show it to be a carefully considered and protracted process. My hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) referred to the Sentencing Advisory Panel. I have no intention of changing that—it does an excellent job. The reports of academics and various other people at the technical or boffin end of sentencing are carefully considered. 
 Amendment No. 541 makes a point that I hope the Minister will consider. It proposes that the Secretary of State, the Lord Chief Justice or the relevant Select Committee Chairman 
''must first propose to the Sentencing Advisory Panel that it prepares a report''. 
It would mean that no one could kick-start the system by jumping the council into a new debate about a particular sentencing problem, rush it through and use a majority to force his opinion on an unwilling sentencing council. 
 May I also point out an error in my drafting of amendment No. 541. Yet again, I refer to the Lord Chief Justice as the Lord Chancellor. I do not know whether they would be flattered or insulted. I meant the amendment to refer to the Lord Chief Justice. 
 Once the panel has considered a report, it would go to the council. The council must proceed by consent. It must have an open, long-term debate, hear all the voices, and come to a conclusion. I cannot imagine that the council would ever vote or try to create a faction or majority. It must proceed by appropriate consensus and debate. To reassure my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, I absolutely do not wish this to be seen in any way as disregarding judicial expertise. On the contrary, I hope that it will be complementary and help the judiciary in their difficult job. If it is not, we need to draft it in such a way that the intention is clear. 
 I am not sure whether I am allowed to use props in Committee, but one of Friday's tabloid headlines reads ''Blunkett and Woolf at war over sentencing''. That does no one anywhere in the criminal justice system any good—whether they are an offender, a victim, the Lord Chief Justice or the Home Secretary. I have dealt with the Lord Chief Justice and the Home Secretary, and I have the greatest respect for them. I know that they and the Select Committee Chairman simply want to do the best for the criminal justice system and those involved in it. It is absolute nonsense to have people pitted against one another, although there will, of course, be disagreements, and we need a framework in which to overcome them. No one is helped by the continual personalisation and trivialisation of genuine debates that need to be had, and I am sure that all those involved, including members of the Committee, are people of good will. 
 We are feeling our way forward in search of a way of reconciling different views so that we can all work together and create a sentencing framework that works for everyone. I thank the Minister—and you, Mr. Cran, for your forbearance.

Hilary Benn: Good afternoon, Mr. Cran.
 This has been an excellent debate, and like other hon. Members, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North for initiating it. We have laid bare all the considerations that will need—I say ''will need'' deliberately, for reasons to which I shall come later—to be borne in mind as we try to get the new arrangements and the role and composition of Sentencing Guidelines Council right. 
 I was struck by a phrase that my hon. Friend used in his opening remarks. He said that we needed a steady, careful and rational way of dealing with the issues, and I wholeheartedly concur. It is clear from our discussion that we are trying to create a process that is clear, workable and widely understood, particularly so that public confidence, which many hon. Members have stressed, is enhanced and assured. We are trying to create a process that assists sentencers in applying guidelines to the offenders before them, and—this has been the most important aspect of the debate—provides for consistency of purpose and application, while avoiding excessive prescription. 
 A system that does all that would certainly guard against the risks that have been mentioned. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield, for example, referred to people being swayed by events, while my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar mentioned the rush to please the public. It would also help to address the issue of complexity, to which the hon. Gentleman referred when he quoted from ''Archbold''. That would assist sentencers with their job. 
 In essence, that is what we are grappling with. We are trying to find the right balance, the right safeguards, the time and opportunity to contemplate what the guidelines should look like, and the right mechanisms for consulting the broader public. In that respect, my hon. and learned Friend helpfully drew our attention to the Sentencing Advisory Panel, which carries out a lot of research, including public consultation, as part of its responsibilities. As will be made clear in the clauses to which we shall come shortly, the panel will continue to play an important part in relation to the arrangements in the Bill. 
 The Sentencing Guidelines Council—everyone agrees that it is a good thing and that this is the right time to create it—will clearly be the linchpin of the mechanism that we must construct together. It is clear that Parliament must set the policy, but it is equally clear that the court must hand down the sentence in individual cases. Of course, we must safeguard proper judicial independence. In saying that the Sentencing Guidelines Council will be the linchpin of the system, we should recognise that such guidelines as it is proposed that the council produce 
 will be close to the decision-making process in individual cases. We should reflect on that and bear such matters in mind when deciding on the checks and balances, and on the opportunities to be given to everyone who has a legitimate role to play in the process to understand where that balance should finally be held. 
 It was for that reason that John Halliday originally proposed in his report that the council should consist of sentencers from all tiers of the criminal courts, including, of course, lay justices. That was the point that the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) made in talking about the gender balance within the group listed. I think that about 50 per cent. of magistrates are now women, but I accept her argument in relation to the other people listed in subsection (4) as it is currently drafted. 
 Setting guidelines to ensure that sentences are consistent in approach is currently done by the Court of Appeal and the Magistrates Association, working with the district judges and the Justices' Clerks Society. The aim is for the council to continue and develop that work. In so doing it will undoubtedly acquire a higher profile. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked a question about that. At the same time, we believe, as has been evident from the debate, that Parliament has a legitimate role in considering how the laws that it has passed are implemented. That is why the Government are committed to involving Parliament more formally in the process of creating sentencing guidelines than in the past. Under the clauses, Parliament will have an opportunity to contribute to the development of those guidelines. Our thinking thus far has been that that should be through a Committee such as the Select Committee on Home Affairs, which has extensive powers to examine and influence the decisions of the council in an open way, while leaving final decisions to the council itself. The council will also report annually to Parliament. If a parliamentary Committee wanted to consider the issues raised by the report, it would be able to invite attendance from the council. 
 There are also issues of practicality to consider. There are more than 2,000 offences for which guidelines need to be considered. In practice Parliament is likely to have a significant interest in relatively few of those. We do not wish to introduce a mechanism that creates an expectation that Parliament wishes to pore over all the guidelines in great detail, when we know that it will not. We must also bear in mind that issue of practicality. 
 Having said all that and having recognised that the final decision on the content of the guidelines should be left to the Sentencing Guidelines Council, I tell the Committee, in response to today's excellent debate, to the points raised by the amendments and to the discussion in the last few weeks, that we continue to reflect on the composition of the council because we need to address that issue. I have heard all the arguments about the need to get the balance right. We need to reflect further on issues to do with the composition of the council, and the means of 
 parliamentary scrutiny. We should therefore like to return to those issues on Report.

Lady Hermon: While the Minister is reflecting on the views that have been expressed, would he also consider again the example and the lesson from Northern Ireland, where there was a loss of confidence in the judicial system, whereby under the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 the Judicial Appointments Commission was set up? I appreciate that that is a different body, but its composition is crucial to building back public confidence, a matter that the hon. Members for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) and for Nottingham, North raised. There are 13 members: the chairman is the Lord Chief Justice, five persons are members of the judiciary, one is appointed from the Bar Council for Northern Ireland, another is a solicitor appointed by the Law Society, and there are five lay members who are representative of the community. In Northern Ireland, women and ethnic minorities are not well represented in the judiciary. Although the Minister has spoken about women as lay magistrates, I heard nothing about ethnic minorities being represented in the judiciary. It is important that their voice be heard.

James Cran: I did not interrupt, but that was more like a mini-speech than an intervention.

Hilary Benn: I will certainly reflect on the points that the hon. Lady made. She reminded us in an earlier debate of the changes to judicial appointments in Northern Ireland and of the particular circumstances that have given the issue of confidence in the process even more salience and political force than is the case outside Northern Ireland. She makes a good point. I believe the latest figure is that 5.7 per cent. of magistrates are drawn from the ethnic minorities. We will shortly discover from the census the extent to which that reflects our society. It is obviously an important point.

David Heath: The Minister is being very helpful in his response. Will he consider that it is essential to involve Parliament earlier than subsection (8) would allow? Under it, the Secretary of State and the Lord Chancellor would be consultees, and that does not adequately reflect the case that the hon. Member for Nottingham, North made.
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Hilary Benn: I shall now deal briefly with amendments Nos. 541 and 538. In addressing amendment No. 541, I shall respond to the point that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) raised in his intervention. Amendment No. 541 would remove the council's power to determine the priorities of issues that require guidelines. Ministers and/or the Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs would be given the power to direct the Sentencing Advisory Panel to provide advice, which the council would then be obliged to consider.
 The council is responsible for sentencing guidelines, so it seems appropriate that it should determine the priorities for the panel. However, we must recognise that, under the Bill, both the Secretary of State and the panel can indicate to the council that they feel that there is an issue that must be dealt with. Moreover, the panel, when that process begins, must have an opportunity to be notified in order to research, consult and express a view. 
 The Secretary of State's present power to propose to the council that a guideline be considered is sufficient to take account of Parliament's concerns. That was the point that the hon. Gentleman raised. However, in practice, the council will be aware of points that others have raised. For example, if the Home Affairs Committee were to identify something, I am sure that the council would look at it. We shall undoubtedly reflect on Report on the mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of the council's work. 
 As regards amendment No. 538, the Bill already contains provisions for the council to make an annual report to Ministers on the exercise of its functions and for that report to be laid before Parliament. I would expect the council to take the initiative in producing useful information for a range of people, including the public. I would also expect that information to be easily accessible. The annual report may form a part of that information. However, I am not persuaded that to place a statutory obligation on the council as to the way in which it produces information for the public would be beneficial. Therefore I request that amendment No. 538 be withdrawn.

Graham Allen: I was just looking for amendment No. 538 in the group of amendments. Since I did not table it, I am happy to withdraw it. I see that it should be amendment No. 638.
 I thank the Minister for his comments and for his positive attitude towards the way in which all Members have dealt with the matter. That is almost unique in my experience, and the Minister is to be commended for his open-mindedness in agreeing to consider further the points raised. To an extent, our job finishes in Committee. However, the Minister has the difficult job of discussing the nitty-gritty with the Home Secretary and the Lord Chief Justice. I wish the Minister well. Both the Home Secretary and the Lord Chief Justice are people of good will who want sentencing to command public support. I am sure that however difficult the negotiations are, he will be working with people who want the process to be a success. 
 We shall come to some subsidiary questions, but we have dealt with the main thrust of what we attempted to do today. I thank the Minister for his positive response to the amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 151 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 152 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 153 - Guidelines relating to sentencing and allocation

Graham Allen: I beg to move amendment No. 539, in
clause 153 page 85, line 20, at end insert— 
 '(1A) The Sentencing Guidelines Council shall issue a list of Standard Band sentences for offences in particular categories requested by the Home Secretary or Lord Chief Justice. This list shall be available to the public in the Annual Report of the Council and in whatever other formats are agreed by the Council. The Standard sentence shall be applied in the context of guidelines issued by the Council and with full judicial discretion which, where exercised, shall be explained in writing.'.
 The amendment relates to the specific duties and expectations that it is right to place on the sentencing council. Considering the matter from the public's perspective, clarity is helpful, wherever possible, but clarity can be present only on the basis that we know, having laid down a guideline or sentencing band, that there will be judicial discretion. In that way, the judiciary will interpret guidelines or tariffs in the light of the evidence of any particular case. 
 The hon. Member for North Down made a pertinent point about incorporating judicial independence and discretion in the Bill. The Minister replied fully to her remark, but why not include that in the Bill? That would assist the Minister incredibly in his dealings with the judiciary when discussing various possibilities regarding the sentencing council. 
 The Minister will know better than anyone the work programme that must be gathering in the minds of his officials in connection with setting up the sentencing council. All I ask is that, when the sentencing council starts its work, it should pick out some key offences that resonate with the public, whether it be burglary or other offences, so that the public understand that the sentencing council is working on their behalf in attempting to explain how sentencing works. That will be a matter for the discretion of people on the sentencing council. Explaining why certain standard tariffs or bands are applicable in certain cases will assist public understanding immensely. 
 My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar eloquently described the public's misperceptions about current sentences and how, for example, although crime has fallen, the public's perception is that it has risen. I do not want to start a debate about the police service, but the problem is partly that people do not feel reassured. If they felt reassured, they would believe that crime was falling. Equally, on sentencing, if the public understood why certain sentences were given for certain offences, they would feel more at ease and would not fall prey to some of the wilder exaggerations in the tabloid press. 
 Amendment No. 539 also requires the list of key offences to be made available to the public in the sentencing council's annual report, as well as in whatever other formats are agreed by the council. I was assisted by the Clerk in drafting the amendment. I know that the Minister has a small easy-to-read document produced by the Home Office, which explains how the criminal justice system works. I have used that extensively. Indeed—I must be careful 
 not to get into trouble with the Serjeant-at-Arms—I have sent copies to many constituents who had questions about policing and the criminal justice system. That is exactly the sort of thing that we should be doing. Over and above the things that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar mentioned, such as connections with magistrates and the good things that we will be doing on the sentencing council, we should involve people personally and directly in their criminal justice system. 
 I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will wave one of those copies at the appropriate moment, but what is done nationally could easily be done locally. For a small amount of money, many Committee members produce annual reports that they sent to all households in their constituency. To send a report about the criminal justice system to every household in my city of Nottingham would cost about £12,000—a fleabite in terms of the criminal justice budget in the area. People would have something tangible that would explain the criminal justice system and how the courts work, that would tell them how they can contact victim support, how better to contact the police, how to complain and so on. That is one way of reuniting the criminal justice system with the public.

Lady Hermon: I want to add to the hon. Gentleman's suggestion by recommending that instead of sending the report directly to the public, it should be sent to all main and local newspapers. It is the newspapers that so often misinform the public. If they published that report, it would be helpful—and it would save money.

Graham Allen: The hon. Lady makes an intriguing suggestion. Some newspapers abuse their often exclusive access to the courts. Members of the public do not sit in the gallery in vast numbers, and newspapers can abuse the system because the public do not understand how sentencing works and people cannot dismiss their reports. However, those who know a little more about the process will understand how complicated sentencing is and how, in particular cases, a judge had to take account of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The newspapers would find it a little more difficult to get away with some of their more outlandish claims if the public were wired more effectively into the criminal justice system.
 The amendment states: 
''The Standard sentence shall be applied in the context of guidelines issued by the Council and with full judicial discretion''.
 The framework is clear. Starting with a clear band or even a defined level for each offence, guidelines would make the system more elaborate and comprehensible to the judiciary as well as to the public. On top of that, as always, there would be full judicial discretion; judges could use their brains, judgment and experience to come up with a specific sentence for a particular offence. 
 That is how the process should work. The process should involve us all, including the public, and it should command widespread public support. There will be further amendments to later parts of the Bill, but I have said that when judicial discretion is used, it 
 should be explained in writing, not least for the victim and the offender. That would also benefit those reading sentencing records on future occasions. 
 I hope that the amendment will make a useful addition to the Minister's armoury. As well as judicial consent and the consent of the Executive, we need the consent of the public. Above all, that requires a degree of clarity, so that a half-way intelligent layman can comprehend the sentencing process.

Dominic Grieve: The amendment, to which I did not subscribe my name, is extremely interesting. I did not sign it because I was not sure that it was going in the direction that I was seeking with the amendments that we will consider in the next group.
 That does not diminish my interest in the amendment. What I found most interesting, although I do not have an answer for it, is whether it is possible to split banding from guidelines as the hon. Gentleman envisages. It is of particular interest to me because I was struck by the thought that Parliament should have a greater role in setting bands but not in setting the guidelines. I think that the hon. Gentleman understands the distinction. I came to the conclusion that it might be very difficult to make that distinction. Therefore I ceased trying and came up with the next group of amendments. 
 I will be particularly interested to hear the Minister's view of such a possibility. I shall enlarge on what I see as the problem, but I will be only too happy if somebody can persuade me that I have got it wrong. Banding would be a broad approach, saying that particular offences should attract a particular sentence within the maximums or minimums set by Parliament. Perhaps banding does not take into account other guideline considerations such as mitigating circumstances, the age of the offender and the number of his previous convictions. There will simply be a straightforward statement in order to set a band. Banding will become meaningless unless it is accompanied by the more detailed guidelines that set the criteria by which we either raise or diminish sentences. 
 I would be only too happy to be persuaded that I am wrong and that it is possible to do such splitting. It would facilitate my task in trying to get Parliament to play a role, which is the aim behind the next group of amendments. If Committee members or the Minister have a view on that, I would be only too happy to hear it.

Paul Stinchcombe: Can the hon. Gentleman help to set the context for this part of the debate by explaining from his barristerial experience what happens now? My understanding, and I am not a practitioner in criminal law, is that judges are routinely issued with copies of ''Thomas on Sentencing'', which gives the tariff sentence for an offence, and that they take into account exacerbating or mitigating circumstances that might increase or reduce the sentence.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman is right, but the tariff is fairly meaningless unless viewed alongside the criteria that must be applied to it. It may be possible to split the two so that one sets the tariff and the other the mitigating or exacerbating circumstances.
 However, there is a certain artificiality about that, and I worry that it will also send out a very mixed message. One of the Committee's concerns is to increase the transparency of the legal system in order to increase public trust in it. The public may find such splitting mysterious and difficult to understand. I may be wrong, but I found it difficult to understand how the two criteria could be distinguished.
 Moreover, two bodies doing two different jobs could create a serious problem. It was suggested to me that Parliament could set the bands and leave the judges to set the guidelines. There are, however, considerable problems associated with such a suggestion. I accept that this is slightly different; it is about publicising the banding in a particular fashion separately from the guidelines. However, some of the same problems might apply.

Paul Stinchcombe: Another difficulty would be the breadth of the bands. For example, for rape it would have to be from five years to life.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman is right. I have no difficulty in agreeing with him. It is part of what I call the potential meaninglessness of the bands on their own. Once we start trying to narrow the bands, we go into the area of guidelines. I find the distinction difficult to make. Therefore, sympathetic as I am to the aim of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North—indeed I should like to be persuaded by it for my own use—I have concluded that it cannot reasonably be done. I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response.

David Heath: Again, this is an area in which the principle espoused by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North should be considered. I am less concerned about the detail because I do not expect the Minister to accept the amendment. However, I hope that he will consider the thought processes behind it. We would all agree that transparency aids comprehension and comprehension aids confidence. If we can find a way in which to let the public and those who inform them know in understandable terms the structure of both banding and guidance, that will be a good thing.
 I echo the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar. An individual who is not a professional in the judicial system will see each case in isolation. He will not look at the newspapers every day, study the law reports and find out what the span of sentencing is; he will look at the case that affects him or in which he is interested, or to which his attention has been drawn by a journalist, and will have a fragmented view of what the sentencing system is likely to deliver. However, if he were made aware of the entire span of considerations, the range of offences and the consequences, in sentencing terms, he would have a better understanding of where that individual case and those particular circumstances fell within the range. 
 The hon. Member for Nottingham, North is at pains to set out the freedom of discretion that is properly available to the judiciary. We shall come back to the matter later. I was concerned at one stage when he spoke about a single tariff point rather than bands, 
 because that is to move away from the point. The discretion is there and it is not unreasonable that in circumstances in which a broad band is set out but a judge exercises his or her discretion to sentence outside of the band, an explanation is adduced for his or her having done so. The public have a right to expect that, and those involved in the case are entitled to know why, in those circumstances, the judge has sentenced in a way that seems to fall outside the norms that have been set by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. For all those reasons, the amendment is a useful start for a debate. It might not be perfect, but I hope that the Minister will give it appropriate consideration.

David Cameron: I want to help out my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. Perhaps we are reading too much into the word ''band'' in the amendment. We should consider what the Court of Appeal produces, for example, on burglary. The celebrated case is the Lord Chief Justice's Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Regina v. McInerney and Keating. It took the Sentencing Advisory Panel's views about burglary and gave a commentary on them. The panel had defined a standard burglary and added some aggravating and mitigating features—it was not complicated stuff.
 That said, I would like to think that we, as parliamentarians, could draft things rather more clearly than they have been in the law reports, which are extremely complicated. I do not see why the proposed sentencing council could not do much of the work suggested by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North. It could say not only that burglary would carry a sentence of somewhere between one and 10 years, but that standard burglaries and standard burglaries with some or many aggravating features would carry particular sorts of sentence. That is what the Court of Appeal does. Could not the council do that, and could not Parliament scrutinise it, as we have discussed? That would be much better than the current proposals, which everyone seems to have misunderstood. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister seem to have completely misinterpreted what the Lord Chief Justice said. Sadly, however, I do not think that I will get my new clause 10.

Hilary Benn: This has been an interesting exchange, because we started with a plea for greater clarity for the benefit of the public but then began to do the Sentencing Guidelines Council's work for it. None the less, the discussion has been interesting, because it has teased out hon. Members' understanding of bands and how they relate to mitigating and aggravating factors.
 We certainly envisage that the guidelines will set ranges of appropriate sentences and suggest starting points within each range, depending on the circumstances of the case, and that is perhaps slightly more flexible than a standard band. 
 The intervention of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield demonstrated the difficulty with accepting the amendment, and the precise reasons 
 emerged in the little debate that ensued about what it meant. It would be inadvisable, in determining the most appropriate way to bring the clarity that we all seek to the sentencing system's work and its application in practice, to fetter in statute the council's discretion as to the form in which it publishes its guidelines. 
 I hope, however, that I can reassure my hon. Friend by saying that we anticipate that the council will publish its guidelines in a single document that can be amended and added to as new guidelines are agreed. We envisage that that document will be readily available to the public electronically and in hard copy. The amendment therefore has a second deficiency, although, again, I recognise its spirit. It would not be sensible to tie the publication of the guidelines to the annual report, because the guidelines will be continuously available in other forms. They should not be solely confined to the annual report, which, by definition, will appear only once every 12 months. 
 With that reassurance, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw the amendment.

Graham Allen: I think that the Minister has reassured me that we are dealing with not only a legal process but a political and public process. I tabled the amendments so that the sentencing council's work could be opened up to public understanding, which would immensely reinforce the work that is done in the courts and in the council. I thank my hon. Friend for his comments and I hope that he will bear our ideas in mind as his discussions on the issue progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 679, in clause 153, page 85, line 32, leave out 'as definitive guidelines'.

James Cran: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 680, in clause 153, page 86, line 13, leave out subsection (8). 
 No. 681, in clause 153, page 86, line 21, leave out subsection (9). 
 No. 542, in clause 153, page 86, line 22, after 'appropriate', insert 'if the Lord Chief Justice so consents,'. 
 No. 701, in clause 153, page 86, line 22, leave out 'as definitive guidelines' and insert 'as its recommendation to Parliament.'. 
 No. 702, in clause 153, page 86, line 22, at end add— 
'(10) The appropriate committee the House of Commons will consider any recommendations issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council and report on them if it thinks fit.'.
 No. 703, in clause 153, page 86, line 22, at end add— 
'(11) A copy of the guidelines shall be laid before each House of Parliament and the guidelines shall only have effect after approval by resolution of both Houses.'.

Dominic Grieve: The discussion now moves on to the proposals that I and my hon. Friends came up with on
 how to involve Parliament. It is a probing amendment, designed to stimulate discussion. I shall outline what is proposed.
 We would alter the provisions of the clause so as to remove some of the procedure to be followed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council, substituting for it—this is the nub of the matter—two key provisions, which are included in amendments Nos. 702 and 703. Instead of publishing definitive guidelines, we suggest in amendment No. 701 that the council should publish a recommendation to Parliament. Once that has happened, amendments Nos. 702 and 703, which would insert new subsections, would come into effect. The effect of the amendments would be to make sentencing guidelines a statutory instrument, which would need parliamentary approval. To make the position clear, it would not be for Parliament to formulate the guidelines, but merely to express its approval or disapproval of them. 
 That ties us in with earlier discussions. First, how do we persuade the public that they have ownership of the issue and can provide input? We considered the proposals suggested by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North, who said that it could be achieved by having public representatives on the Sentencing Guidelines Council. In reality, however, that body will be a committee, as it were, of the great and the good, even if the so-called members of the public appear on it. We also touched on the fact that the sentencing guidelines are, in a sense, an expert matter. Many people, who are not judges, have expertise and should be heard. Simply to ask people off the street to help who have no experience of the range of offences or of many other issues would be unreasonable and not necessarily helpful. One of the reasons for having the Sentencing Advisory Panel is to provide professional and expert input to the judiciary from other directions. However, although the panel may consult the public, it is not made up of people drawn off the street. 
 Can we measure public approval? The normal way to do that, short of holding a referendum, is for Parliament to pronounce on the matter. We are here in a representative capacity, albeit not delegates. People regularly lobby us, and we are capable of forming and independent judgments. The Home Affairs Committee—it would be the appropriate Committee, although we cannot specify it by name—has the ability to call evidence, to hear expert testimony and to formulate recommendations to be put before the House.

Paul Stinchcombe: Does the hon. Gentleman not foresee problems with public confidence in sentencing, if the sentencing guidelines are to be openly criticised by Parliament immediately thereafter?

Dominic Grieve: That is, without doubt, a potential challenge. However, sentencing guidelines are being criticised by the public now, long after they are formulated. Most members of the public do not know what they are, and their ability to have an input into the process, save through the tabloid press, is limited.
 The question arises whether it would be a grave constitutional issue for Parliament to approve the guidelines. I do not see that happening. We already provide for statutory maximums and, in some cases, statutory minimums. I shall not quote it again, but earlier I read out a passage that reminds judges that the fact that they do not like the statutory maximums set by Parliament does not mean that they should try to get round them by imposing maximum sentences in cases that do not meet the maximum gravity. 
 Those statutory maximums are the result of our decisions, and some are certainly open to criticism. For instance, we have upper sentences of 14 years for theft. Some people would argue that if the theft consisted of a huge or extensive amount of property or could be said to threaten the security of state, the maximum sentence might not be sufficient. I float the idea that we can already be criticised for our statutory maximums. It happens with burglary, as well, in particularly grave cases. Yet although we have decided upon such sentences, it is rare in my experience for the maximum ever to be imposed. 
 Parliament has provided for a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving, and a judge recently sentenced a person to nine and a half years for that offence, which illustrates that he considered the circumstances to be exceptionally grave. Correspondence landed on my desk last week from concerned people who said that the nature of that person's offence was such that a life sentence would not have been considered inappropriate. However, Parliament took the deliberate decision that 10 years was the proper maximum. It is wrong to say that we are out of the process; we are absolutely in it. 
 I do not see there being a constitutional problem. The hon. Member for Nottingham, North said to me privately, and I concur, that one issue is whether it will be Parliament decides or the Executive. That is always a problem when giving power to Parliament, but I have a reasonable degree of confidence because we would not be dealing with state or policy matters such as the economy or health. I have heard more independent views expressed in the House on issues relating to sentencing than on any other issue. As Parliament's decision on sentencing is likely to be based on a Select Committee report, it is highly likely that Members would feel free to express robust views. We could do some good, but it is not without difficulty. 
 Time is short. I put the idea before the Committee for its consideration, and I would be grateful to hear the Minister's views on the proposal.

Graham Allen: Before I prove that I have gone completely native on the judiciary with amendment No. 542, I should pick up on some of the points made by the hon. Gentleman. I know where he is coming from; I appreciate his sentiment on the matter, and it is in line with that of other Committee members.
 We need to involve Parliament in the process. The question is how to do it. It should be a rational process, not one based on reflex. That is what makes it rather difficult. I would have no problem in handing 
 over my sovereignty as a Member to any other Member in the Room to defend and express views about Parliament, particularly in relation to sentencing. I know that, as individual Members, everyone would behave quite acceptably. The problem comes when we change hats and become members or supporters of the Government, or members or supporters of the alternative Government. That is often the point at which we leave our integrity and our brains behind. 
 My worry is that in trying to reassure the judiciary that it has to be a three-way process between the judiciary, the Executive and the legislature, handing power to the Floor of the House would in effect disqualify parliamentarians from making their voice heard. It would give the Home Secretary two votes to one against the Lord Chief Justice. If I may speak for the latter, that would not be a good bargain, and he would be right to stand up for what he has now. That would make negotiations between him and Ministers extremely difficult. 
 In order to ensure that parliamentarians and the judiciary were content about Parliament's role, we would need to be extremely careful not to be perceived as having made the problem worse rather than better. The Minister suggested earlier that the Select Committee might be the best route to achieve that, although there are other routes. I fully understand where the hon. Member for Beaconsfield is coming from on this matter. He wants what I want, which is parliamentary involvement, but we have to devise a subtle and sophisticated mechanism so that it is our views that are heard rather than the views of the Government or alternative Government. Those views must also carry credence with the judiciary.

Paul Stinchcombe: Would my hon. Friend expect, in any event and as a matter of course, the Home Affairs Committee to invite the Sentencing Guidelines Council to give evidence and report upon that evidence?

Graham Allen: That would be an imaginative thing to do. It could be a two-way process if the Home Affairs Committee could be involved in the consultation, even as far back as the Sentencing Advisory Panel. Indeed, one of my amendments proposed that the Committee could initiate a review by the Sentencing Advisory Panel even before the matter gets to the sentencing council. Under another amendment, the Chairman of the Select Committee would be a deputy chairman and a member of the panel, so there would be access and two-way traffic. It would make sense for that discussion to take place openly.
 I would be content with Members on both sides of that Committee, of which my hon. Friend was a distinguished member, representing Parliament. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield suggested that the Home Affairs Committee report could be debated on the Floor of the House, but we have seen what can happen when Select Committee reports that are not approved of by the Executive are debated there. Rubbishing takes place, and the spin machine goes 
 into overdrive against particular recommendations or even against individuals. At all costs, we must avoid that because it would make the situation worse.

Dominic Grieve: I agree about that, but that is one of my anxieties about having an ordinary reporting system to the Select Committee. If the Committee produces a report saying that it does not like a proposal, that is exactly what will happen. If Parliament has to vote anyway, it is less likely that the Government would be in a position to carry out that sort of exercise—because such a report cannot just be lost in the undergrowth. On the Floor of the House, it would be a high-profile issue when it came to the crunch.

Graham Allen: It would be only marginally better than the worst-case option, which is to put it baldly to the House. If it was easy, I am sure that the Minister would have dealt with it and that we would have a properly drafted clause to consider. However, it is open so that we can make a contribution, and we are grateful for that.
 We have some extremely difficult things to think through. One of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, is how Members of Parliament can be genuinely represented in a rational and open process. I repeat that the hon. Gentleman and I—and all the Committee members to whom I have spoken—adhere to the principle and sentiment of his proposal. However, we cannot conjure up a consensus on how to go forward, except to say that it is an extremely difficult and sensitive matter, and that we may need a more subtle and sophisticated—and possibly more imaginative—solution. 
 I shall now speak to amendment No. 542, just to prove how native I have gone with the judiciary. The judiciary will need to be won over to this new and radical way of proposing and implementing sentencing. The amendment provides that after that protracted process—after 18 months of negotiation, during which time people will have been so nice to one another; after a referral to the Sentencing Advisory Panel, and after the panel has spent nine months or a year doing its job thoroughly, taking evidence, bringing in experts, conjuring up a report; after the Sentencing Guidelines Council has considered that report, and once Parliament and the Executive have become involved, all sitting around the same table, talking, networking, and with the Lord Chief Justice being present if he wishes—if the Lord Chief Justice, on behalf of the judiciary, feels that what has emerged from that long and careful process is not acceptable, he can say no. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Graham Allen: I have finished my remarks.

David Heath: The point at which the Select Committee or the House has an opportunity to contribute to the process is important. That is why I am a little concerned about the amendment. It brings Parliament in too late and it allows the Executive to have the final say, if only by default: if it was taken on
 the Floor of the House, there would undoubtedly be a whipped vote. I do not believe that the House would be given a free vote on sentencing guidelines. As we know, even with a free vote, Whips are occasionally tempted at least to influence the outcome.
 It is slightly naive to suppose that it is possible to have an independent view at that stage, and I believe that the Executive should not have the last say on the matter. That is one reason why I am concerned about subsection (8). It seems inappropriate, having gone through those conciliatory and consensual arrangements, to pass it to the Secretary of State, only for him to say no. If anyone is to have the final right of veto, it should be the Lord Chief Justice. 
 A number of hon. Members have suggested that if a Select Committee were to be involved it should be the Home Affairs Committee. I would rather leave that option open, because one could argue that it should be the Select Committee for the Lord Chancellor's Department. I do not say that because my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) will be Chairman, but because that newly formed Committee will have a clear role in examining what that Department does—and sentencing clearly falls within that remit. I am not entirely sure that the Home Affairs Committee, which has an enormous Department to shadow and a great number of responsibilities, is necessarily the right vehicle. I do not wish to be prescriptive, but we should at least keep the option in mind that at least two Committees could have a proper role to play.

Hilary Benn: We are continuing a conversation that we started on the previous clause. We have a further opportunity to discuss the arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny and the operation of the council in creating the guidelines, courtesy this time of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield.
 Sentencing guidelines are a relatively new concept. Practice in the Crown courts has been shaped over many years by judgments and precedents; it is now done through guideline judgments, having regard to the advice of the Sentencing Advisory Panel, which itself is only three and a bit years old. The magistrates courts are covered by the Magistrates Association guidelines, which have been going only for about three years. We are dealing with relatively new ways of working. 
 I shall describe the procedure that will apply if the provisions are agreed, because it will help us understand the place that the different parties will have in the process. The council will decide what guidelines it wishes to consider either of its own motion or following a request from the Home Secretary. The council will then commission the Sentencing Advisory Panel to give advice. The panel will be obliged to consult widely, although there is provision to exempt it from having to do so in urgent cases—for example, if new legislation is being quickly brought into force, or a concern arises requiring new or amended guidelines. The panel then tenders its advice to the council, and the council forms a preliminary view and issues draft guidelines to the Home Secretary. Whatever arrangement is established 
 by Parliament—that is what we have been debating; subject to what I said in response to the earlier debate, the current expectation is that it will be the Home Affairs Committee—the council would then allow up to two months for responses, and would then finalise and issue a definitive guideline. 
 That two-stage provision is designed to make the most effective use of parliamentary time. It would be for the Committee to decide how to conduct its affairs, but I concur with those hon. Members who said that if it were to undertake that function, the Home Affairs Committee would wish to invite witnesses, including from the Sentencing Guidelines Council, and the Home Secretary. It would produce observations to be sent to the Sentencing Guidelines Council, or it would produce a report to Parliament on the proposals themselves, which may be debated. When the guidelines have been published, the Committee may wish to meet with or without witnesses and produce a report to Parliament. That would be a flexible system. 
 The Sentencing Advisory Panel plays an important role. Hon. Members are probably aware that it is a Home Office-sponsored non-departmental public body. Members are currently appointed by the Lord Chancellor, in consultation with the Home Secretary and the Lord Chief Justice, after open advertisement and competition. The current membership includes people with direct judicial experience at Crown courts and magistrates courts, academics, a serving chief probation officer, a former deputy chief constable and others from education, health and other backgrounds. Until recently, a former director general of the Prison Service was a member. Agreement has been reached to extend the membership to include an individual with current or recent experience as a prosecutor. 
 The panel is obliged by statute to consult a range of organisations prescribed by the Lord Chancellor, in consultation with the Home Secretary and the Lord Chief Justice, including Victim Support and organisations representing police officers and prison staff. In fact, it consults more widely; and when appropriate, as we heard earlier from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, it commissions public surveys. 
 I recognise the probing nature of many of the amendments that suggest the removal of certain subsections. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North spoke on several occasions of the Lord Chief Justice's chairing the Sentencing Guidelines Council. Strong support has been expressed for his role, not least because the council is continuing the role currently undertaken by the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, of which the Lord Chief Justice is head. In those circumstances, I see no benefit in providing him with a casting vote, which would be the effect of one amendment. Leaving the final decision to a single member of the judiciary, however eminent, would be less satisfactory than at present. The guidelines are currently delivered by courts, or through the efforts of a group working on the magistrates courts sentencing guidelines; they will be delivered in future under the arrangements that the Sentencing Guidelines Council itself is to establish. 
 Preserving proper judicial independence is therefore extremely important. 
 I repeat with great brevity what I said on earlier amendments. When it comes to the precise nature of Parliament's role, hon. Members have offered various solutions to achieve the necessary subtlety and sophistication. I recognise that we are all reflecting on it as we speak—the Government, the Opposition and those who subscribed their names to amendments—and that we will return to it on Report. I hope that this afternoon's conversation will continue, because I know that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is genuinely interested in the range of ideas on how it can be achieved. To the extent that it might be possible to achieve a consensus, it would clearly be beneficial if we could do it by the time that we reach Report.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. In a moment, I shall ask the Committee's leave to withdraw the amendment. I am mindful of the criticisms that have been made of the proposal; it was not perfect, and I realise that it had inherent problems. However, it is too easy for such a parliamentary dimension to be watered down and sidelined. I fear that it will be diminished if it is left to the mechanism of a Select Committee; history shows all too clearly how easily that can happen. I have served on other Select Committees and seen how easy it is to shunt a subject into the long grass. If we want Parliament to do something, Parliament must play an affirmative role in the process.
 I realise that that is difficult, but I hope that the Minister will consider that aspect and that we can reconsider the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming— 
 Clause 153 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 154 - Functions of Sentencing Advisory Panel in relation to guidelines

David Cameron: I beg to move amendment No. 709, in
clause 154, page 86, line 41, at end add— 
 '(5) With respect to burglary, the sentencing advisory panel and the sentencing council must have regard to the sentencing framework set out in section (Custodial sentences for burglars).'.

James Cran: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 New clause 11—Custodial sentences for burglars— 
'(1) Anyone convicted of the offence of burglary should be sentenced to a minimum of two years in prison, save for the exceptions given in subsection (2) below. 
 (2) The court may disregard the mandatory custodial sentence for burglars in subsection (1) above if, and only if— 
 (a) it is the individual's first conviction for burglary; and 
 (b) the court judges that the case includes exceptional circumstances, as in subsection (3) below. 
 (3) ''Exceptional circumstances'' includes— 
 (a) that the court judges that the defendant is unlikely to reoffend; and 
 (b) that the offence for which the defendant is found guilty does not include any violent or threatening behaviour or other aggravating features.'.

David Cameron: It is not often that one gets three minutes to try to bring about fundamental change in the way that burglars are sentenced. We seem to have reached new clause 11 without considering new clause 10, but no matter.
 The new clause deals with the crime of burglary. There is huge confusion about the issue, some of it brought about by the Government. I do not think that it is all their fault, because the system, as we discussed this morning with reference to guidance, is so hugely complicated. I was already packed up and ready to go, so I can hardly describe my simple amendment and new clause. However, from memory, they would provide for a minimum sentence for burglary of two years in all but the most exceptional circumstances. I define those tightly; the offence should be a first offence and—I do not say ''or'', but ''and''—there should be no aggravating factors whatever. 
 My amendment would be a good thing because, as I said, no one understands the current guidance. It involves no accountability. My new clause is beautifully simple. It comes from a straightforward view of burglary as a hateful and in many ways violent crime—because people's houses are invaded—and a premeditated crime. Burglars are prolific criminals. The scale of the problem can be suggested by my telling the Committee that in 2000–01 there were 836,000 offences of burglary, accounting for 16 per cent. of total crime. That is more than 1,000 for every constituency in the country. The courts are not the only place where there is a problem with respect to burglary. The number of burglars against whom proceedings were taken in 1990 was about 43,000. By 2000 it had dropped to 26,000. There is an awful lot that must be done before getting to court. 
 Current sentencing figures for burglary may suggest whether my new clause would work or would clog up the prisons and be impractical. I do not think that it would. The figures for 2000 show that, of the burglars sentenced, 81 per cent. of those who entered a guilty plea were given custody and 17 per cent. were given a community sentence. Of those who pleaded not guilty, 85 per cent. were given custody and 12 per cent. a community sentence. The average length of sentence was 24 months for a guilty plea and 28 months for a not guilty plea. Therefore, I do not think that we are talking about a big increase in the prison population. 
 In the remaining minute, I want to clarify the three vital things that my amendment would do. First, it would send a clear message that burglars will go to prison—we do not send such a message at the moment. Secondly, it would provide for a tough minimum sentence—not an inappropriate sentence—that made the average the minimum, which would be highly desirable. Thirdly, it would provide for 
 exceptions only in the most restricted circumstances. It would, therefore, be good for confidence in the criminal justice system, good for victims and good for the police. 
 It being fifteen minutes past Five o'clock, The Chairman proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Question put, That clauses 154 to 156 stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clauses 154 to 156 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 157 - Duty to give reasons for,

Amendment proposed: No. 550, in 
clause 157, page 87, line 37, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— 
 '(a) where guidelines indicate that a sentence of a particular kind, or within a particular range, would normally be appropriate for the offence and the sentence is of a different kind, or is outside that range, state the court's reasons for deciding on a sentence of a different kind or outside that range,'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

David Cameron: On a point of order, Mr. Cran. Given that we are in the extraordinary situation of being unable to discuss all the provisions on community orders, suspended sentences—

James Cran: Order. That is not a point of order for the Chair.
 Clause 157, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 158 to 162 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 - Breach, revocation or amendment

Amendments proposed: No. 571, in 
schedule 7, page 188, line 38, leave out from 'Schedule' to end of line 41 and insert— 
 '(a) a requirement falling within any paragraph of section 160(1) is of the same kind as any other requirement falling within that paragraph, and 
 (b) an electronic monitoring requirement is a requirement of the same kind as any requirement falling within section 160(1) to which it relates.'.
 No. 572, in 
schedule 7, page 189, line 24, leave out from 'and' to end of line 27 and insert 'does not include a direction that any failure to comply with the requirements of the order is to be dealt with by a magistrates' court'.
 No. 573, in 
schedule 7, page 189, line 42, leave out from 'and' to end of line 3 on page 190 and insert 'does not include a direction that any failure to comply with the requirements of the order is to be dealt with by a magistrates' court'.
 No. 574, in 
schedule 7, page 190, line 9, leave out from 'order' to end of line 14 and insert 'which was made by the Crown Court and includes a direction that any failure to comply with the requirements of the order is to be dealt with by a magistrates' court'.
 No. 575, in 
schedule 7, page 190, line 36, leave out from 'which' to end of line 39 and insert 'does not include a direction that any failure to comply with the requirements of the order is to be dealt with by a magistrates' court'.
 No. 576, in 
schedule 7, page 194, leave out lines 28 to 31 and insert 'does not include a direction that any failure to comply with the requirements of the order is to be dealt with by a magistrates' court'.
 No. 577, in 
schedule 7, page 195, leave out lines 37 to 43 and insert— 
 '(a) in relation to any community order which was made by the Crown Court and does not include any direction that any failure to comply with the requirements of the order is to be dealt with by a magistrates' court, the Crown Court, and'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clauses 163 to 165 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 166 - Restrictions on power to make intermittent custody order

Amendment proposed: No. 551 in 
clause 166, page 93, line 31, at end insert— 
 '(3) In this section ''custodial period'', in relation to a sentence to which an intermittent custody order relates, means any part of the sentence that is not a licence period.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 166, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 167 to 169 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8 - Revocation or amendment of custody plus orders and amendment of intermittent custody orders

Amendments proposed: No. 578, in 
schedule 8, page 200, line 36, leave out 'that petty sessions area' and insert 'the petty sessions area concerned'.
 No. 579, in 
schedule 8, page 201, line 17, leave out from 'sub-paragraph (1)' to end of line 19 and insert— 
 '(a) a requirement falling within any paragraph of section 164(1) is of the same kind as any other requirement falling within that paragraph, and 
 (b) an electronic monitoring requirement is a requirement of the same kind as any requirement falling within section 164(1) to which it relates.'. 
No. 580, in 
schedule 8, page 201, line 25, after 'order' insert '(a)'.
 No. 581, in 
schedule 8, page 201, line 26, at end insert—
'(b) so as to provide that he is to remain in prison until the number of days served by him in prison is equal to the number of custodial days,'.
 No. 582, in 
schedule 8, page 201, line 31, at end insert—
'(3) In this paragraph ''custodial period'' has the same meaning as in section 166(3).'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clauses 170 to 172 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 173 - Periodic reviews of suspended sentence order

Amendment made: No. 552, in 
clause 173, page 97, line 27, leave out from '(2)(a)' to end of line 29 and insert— 
 '(a) a community requirement falling within any paragraph of section 171(1) is of the same kind as any other community requirement falling within that paragraph, and 
 (b) an electronic monitoring requirement is a community requirement of the same kind as any requirement falling within section 171(1) to which it relates.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 173, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 174 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 - Breach or amendment of suspended sentence order, and effect of further conviction

Amendments proposed: No. 583, in 
schedule 9, page 202, line 26, at end insert— 
 ' ''the offender'', in relation to a suspended sentence order, means the person in respect of whom the order is made;'.
 No. 584, in 
schedule 9, page 203, line 4, leave out from 'that' to 'has' and insert 'the offender'.
 No. 585, in 
schedule 9, page 203, line 26, leave out from 'to' to 'in' in line 27 and insert 'the offender'.
 No. 586, in 
schedule 9, page 205, line 38, leave out 
 'section 84 of the Sentencing Act' 
 and insert 
 'section (Restriction on consecutive sentences for released prisoners)'.
 No. 587, in 
schedule 9, page 207, line 36, leave out 
 'during the term of imprisonment to which a suspended sentence order relates' 
 and insert 
 'while a suspended sentence order is in force'.
 No. 588, in 
schedule 9, page 207, line 39, leave out 'during the licence period'.
 No. 589, in 
schedule 9, page 207, line 39, leave out 'that petty sessions area' and insert 
 'the petty sessions area concerned'.
 No. 590, in 
schedule 9, page 208, line 21, leave out from 'subparagraph (1)' to end of line 23 and insert— 
 '(a) a requirement falling within any paragraph of section 171(1) is of the same kind as any other requirement falling within that paragraph, and 
 (b) an electronic monitoring requirement is a requirement of the same kind as any requirement falling within section 171(1) to which it relates.'.—[Hilary Benn.] 
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clauses 175 to 191 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 192 - Alcohol treatment requirement

Amendments proposed: No. 694, in 
clause 192, page 109, line 6, leave out 'and'.
 No.695, in 
clause 192, page 109, line 8, at end insert 
 'and 
 (c) that arrangements have been or can be made for the treatment intended to be specified in the order (including arrangements for the reception of the offender where he is to be required to submit to treatment as a resident);'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 192, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 193 to 199 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 10 agreed to. 
 Clauses 200 and 201 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 202

Amendments proposed: No. 696, in 
clause 202, page 113, line 11, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert— 
 '(a) the supervision of persons who are subject to relevant orders, 
 (b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), the functions of responsible officers in relation to offenders subject to relevant orders, 
 (ba) the arrangements to be made by local probation boards for persons subject to unpaid work requirements to perform work and the performance of such work,'.
 No. 697, in 
clause 202, page 113, line 26, at end insert— 
 '(2) Rules under subsection (1)(ba) may, in particular, make provision— 
 (a) limiting the number of hours of work to be done by a person on any one day, 
 (b) as to the reckoning of hours worked and the keeping of work records, and 
 (c) for the payment of travelling and other expenses in connection with the performance of work.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 202, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 203 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at half-past Five o'clock till Tuesday 11 February at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.